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Monopoly Wealth and International Debt
ABSTRACT
When rents generated by government policies are perceived as
permanent, the rights to earn them may be capitalized as assets
that form a component of nonhuman wealth. The existence of such
assets raises international indebtedness, while shifts in policy
that increase or reduce the importance of such rents can generate
movements in the current account that are correlated with the
real exchange rate. Because the elimination of policies that
generate rents imposes a capital loss that is born entirely by
generations currently alive, while the benefit of the removal of
a distortion is shared between those alive and unborn
generations, a possibility is that such a reform can reduce the
expected lifetime welfare of everyone alive. If monopoly exists
in the provision of nontraded goods then there may be several





(415) 723—0596The effects of rents created by government policies have
been a major concern of the theory of political economy in the
last decade. This work follows from Tullock's (1967) and
Krueger's (1974) seminal concept of rent seeking as a
resource—using activity that provides access to rents in the
economy. Because this activity in itself absorbs productive
resources, the consequences of rent—creating policies can go far
beyond their direct allocative and redistributionaleffects.1
The analysis of this paper takes as its point of departure
the observation that entitlements to rents created by government
policy can be capitalized in asset values. The presence of these
assets as a form of nonhuman wealth can therefore have
significant implications for the dynamic behavior of the economy.
In particular, by displacing other forms of wealth in national
portfolios, the existence of monopoly can increase international
indebtedness.
1 - Bhagwatiand Srinavasan (1980) and Bhagwata (1982) have
introduced the related notions of revenue seeking and
directly-unproductive—profit (DUP) seeking and examine their
implictions for a number of issues in the theory of commercial
policy. Other important contributions to the literature are by
Brock and Magee (1978,1980), Buchanan, Tullock and Tollison
(1980), Findlay and Wellisz (1982), and Hillman and Riley (1987).
Tollison (1982) and Bhagwati, Brecher, and Srinivasan (1984)
provide overviews of work in the area. This literature, to my
knowledge, has not considered the implications of rents for
capital accumulation.2
The portfolio implications of monopoly rents have received
little attention. An important exception is Laitner's (1982)
analysis of the effect of monopoly on the capital stock in an
overlapping generations economy. Laitner shows, in a closed
economy, that the presence of capitalized monopoly rents reduces
welfare in steady state by displacing capital in individualst
portfolios, and that this effect may quantitatively overwhelm the
cost arising from static resource misallocation.2
The analysis here concerns the implications of domestic
monopoly for the current account and for foreign indebtedness. A
particular reason for this focus is to illustrate the effect on
foreign debt of policies that affect the size of rents generated
in the economy. Governments in a number of the large debtor
countries have pursued policies that appear to create significant
rents domestically.
Indonesia provides an example. A common practice has been
to grant monopolies to importers as well as to domestic producers
of a number of industrial commodities. In 1985, for example, of
5229 coomodity classification numbered items, importation of 1484
were restricted to holders of government licenses.(Only 296
2Mitchell (1987) has recently analyzed theimplications of the
capitalization of rents created by an import quota for trade and
production patterns.3
were subject to quotas.)3Most of these itemswere manufactures
The dollar valueof importssubject to theserestrictions equaled
US$ 2.7 billion,Which correspondedto 30 per cent oftotal
imports. Applyinga mark-up factor of20 per cent yieldsan
estimate of monopolyprofits from licensing
of 1.2 per cent of
GDP. If all of theserents are capitalizedat a discount factor
of ten per cent,then their assetvalue is 12 percent of GDP, or
about 27 per cent of
outstanding foreign debt.Licensing
arrangee5 have also beenwidely Used in domestic
manufacturing generatingadditional sources ofrent.
Determining theirquantitatj importance ismore difficult but
numerous descriptions ofthe economysuggest that they are
Signifjc4
To focus on the
rent—creating rather thanon the
terms_of_trade effectsof monopoly, Iconsid a country that
does not affectworld prices, and flWhich monopoly ispresent in
the domesticretailing of certainproductsFurthermore, to
focus on the roleof monopoly ingenerating rents rather thanin
3See thediscussion in Pangest(1987). Recentarticles in the and rcopoic Review alsodescribe aspects of recentPolicy in Indonesia.
4Estimatesof rents in some
developing countriesare much larger. Krueger (1982)reports estimates of 7.3per cent of GD? for India and 15 per cent forTurkey. If the secondestimate were fully capitalized at a discountfactor of tenper cent then theirasset value would equal150 per cent ofGDP, which Is likelyto be a large fraction oftotal wealth. Whatshare of rents isactually capitalized would bedifficult to determine.4
changing factor rewards,the first part of theanalysis is of a
country that tradesenough commodities andfactors at given world
prices to determinedomestic factor rewards,at world prices1
independent of the extentof monopoly in domesticretailing.
Wealth accumulation is governedby individualmaximization
of expected lifetime utilitywith uncertain individuallifetimes,
as in the frameworkdeveloped by Yaari (1965)and Blanchard
(l985). I restict myself to consider
a country that has
unrestricted access to foreigncapital and brieflydiscuss the
implications of relaxingthis assumption later.
Three main conclusionsfollow from this analysis.First, in
comparing two otherwiseidentical economies, the onein which
domestic retailing ismonopolized has a steady—statelevel of net
foreign i.ndebtness
exceeding that in the competitiveeconomy.
The difference Sexactlyequal to the capitalizedvalue of
monopoly rents.
An implication of thisresult is that, in comparinga
country's foreign indebtedness
with the value of itsnonhuman
domestic wealth, it is importantto take into accountthe effect
of capitalized monopoly
rents on asset values.To the extent
that wealth represents
capitalized rents, it doesnot reflect
productive resourcesavailable to finance repayment.
5This framework has been appliedextensively to study issuesin
international finance. See,for example, Frenkeland Razifl
(1986), Engel and Kletzer(1987), and Buiter (1986).5
A second andclosely relatedC0flC1US1O is that
liberalization ofmonopoly will cause acurrent accountsurplus. The extent toWhich the surplus
precedes rather thanfollows the
liberalization dependsupon how long it isanticipated
This resultprovides an explanationfor the negative
correlation between thereal exchange rateand the current
account that has beenobserved forexample, by Sachs(1981). An increase inmonopolization of domestic
supply raises the domestic
prIce level relativeto that elsewhere.This IS reflectedin an
appreciation of the realexchange rate. At thesame time,
monopoly Wealth increases,which attractscapital from abroad.A
liberalization, incontrast, causes realdepreciation andcapital Outflow.
A third conclusionis that thecapitalization ofmonopoly rents can create
a constituency infavor ofmonopoly that, in the
extreme consists ofall of those alive.Hence majoritari
decision_making can introduceor Sustain
monopoly despite the
distortion itcreatesThe reason is thatthe capital loss
associated withliberalization is bornsolely by the livingwhile
the benefit ofremoving the distortion isshared between the
living and the unborn.
Monopoly acts inpart as an unfunded
social securitysystem. This result
Illustrates the extentto
which thecapitalization ofmonopoly rents canaugment Opposition to reform.
As mentioned, theresults stated so farapply to an economy6
in which world pricesof traded goodsand factors uniquely
determine factor rewards,and hence the costof nontraded goods.
regardless of theextent of monopolization.If world prices of
traded goods and factorsdo not uniquelydetermine factor
rewards, however, thenthe presence ofnontraded goods can break
the independence betweenmonopoly practicesand factorrewards.6
The resultinginterdependence betweenthe size of monopolyrents
and the level of factorrewards introduces thepossibilitY of
multiple equilibria
for reasons that havebeen discussed, in a
closed economy, by Kiyotaki
(1985) and Cooperand John (1986)
among others: Ahigh level of productionof nontraded goods
raises the real wage,and onsequefltlY thelevel of expenditure
on nontraded goodsin steady state. Becauseof this positive
relationshiP between the wageand output there maybe several
different steady—state
allocations, some ofwhich Pareto dominate
others. A higherlevel of economicactivity and totalinvestment
characterize the preferredequilibrium. Whethernet indebtedness
is larger or smallerin this steady stateis ambigOuS, sinceboth
domestic and nationalwealth are greater.
The outline of the paperis as follows.Section I below
describes the economy Iconsider. In sectionii i discuss the
6Commodities may be nontraded becauseof natural impedimentsto
international trade or becauseof government restriCti0fl
In
fact, an import prohibitiofl
may naturally generatea domestic
monopoly, or accompanythe licensing of asingle domestic
producer.7
relationship betweenmonopoly rents and internationaldebt. The
current account dynamics
accompanying liberalization are
characterized in Sectioniii. Section ivconsiders the
implications of liberalizationfor the welfare ofcurrent
generationsSection vtreatsflontraded goods andmultiple
equilibriaFinally, in Section vi Idiscuss some limitationsof
the analysis andareas for furtherresearch.
I. The Structureof Economy
The economy can becharacterizeä in terms ofpreferences
over commodities withinany period, the production
technology,
and preferencesover expenditure in differentperiods.
A.
Preferences and MarketStructure
In each period individual
preferences toward commodities
correspond to that positedby Dixit and Stiglitz(1977), which
has been which hasbeen usedextensively in modelling
international trade underconditions of imperfect competition7
There are n+1commodities produced andconsumed in any
7SeeHelpman and Krugman(1985) for a discussionof the specification of preferencesin models of internationaltrade under conditions ofimperfect competition.8
period. The utilityderived by the representativeconsumer from
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wherea E (0,oo), a E [0,11and 0 E (0,1]. These preferences
ensure that expenditureeach period on commodityn+1, which I
call the agricultural goodand which is alwaysretailed
competitiVelY is a constantshare 1—a of total consumption
expenditurei denoted C.Expenditure on the first ngoods,. which
I call industrial goodsand which may be retailed
monopolisticallyi is consequently(1-a)C independent ofwhat each
supplier charges.
Consider the case in whichthe number of commoditiestraded
freely in world marketssuffices to ensure thatworld commodity
prices fully determinefactor rewards. It isconvenient to
choose units so that allcommodity prices in worldmarkets are
unity. Since the costof producing any nontradedcommodity is
also determined, this cost canbe set at one as well.The first
m commodities, where m<n,are retailed monopoliSticallyiwhile
the remaining n+l—m arecompetitively supplied, andhence are
available to consumers at a priceone.
Each domestic monopolist isassumed to set an output price,9
taking all other pricesas given, to maximizeits profit in terms
of the numeraireThe Appendix derivesthe first—ordercondition
for this maximizationIn two specialcases this expression
yields a closed_form
solution for M and forprofit.
(I)
Industrial Supply









Note that thisexpression increases inaC, total expendit-ure
on industrial goods, anddecreases in n, the numberof Industrial
commodities, and in 0, which isinversely related to the
elasticity of demand foratypical Industrial good.As n,oo, Mp".l/oand lT-9aC(1--e)10
(ii) A Larcte Numberof Industrial cg-
Considerthe case in which thenumber of industrial
commodities n becomes very large,holding the ratio of
commodities retailed by amonopOliSt to the total(rn/n) constant.





Given the priceM charged by monopolistic
retailers, the
utility derived by arepresentative consumer sspending an amount
S. .--
Cin anyperlOQ as:
s M 1a 1—a s M —0/(1--6) a(1—0)/O1—0
v(c ,p )=i-{a(1-a) c [m(p ) + (n-m)J
which is condensed below as:
s 1 sM 1-0
v(c,p) =-1-Ecg(p))
B.The PrQdUCti0flTechnolQgy
Each industrial good is producedby the same constaflt
returflStOSCtechnology using land, laborand capital as11
factors of production. Denote
the total output Q' of all
industrial goods as a functionof inputs employed in thatsector
as:
QI =
Theagriculturj good is producedby a different technology
employing these same factors. Itsoutput QA as a function of
inputs employed is:
QA =
HereK1, L1, and T1are the amounts of capital, laborand land in
sector i where 1= I,A. Theeconomy is endowed with a fixed
amount of labor, normalized atone, and an amount of land T.
Capital is perfectly mobileinternationally and is available ata
given world interest rate r*.The supply price of eachcommodity
equals its world market price.Competition in domestic factor
markets consequently determinesthe wage w, the returnon land p,
the supply of domesticcapital KD, and the allocation offactors







As long as both industrialand agricultural products areproduced
domestically then these conditiOnSdetermine factor rewards
independentlY of the endowmentsof labor and land.
C. .i1tertempOral Preferences
Aggregate consumption expenditureC is determined by the
outcome of the representativeindividual's maximization of
expected lifetime utility.The age a at which anyindividual
dies is a random variablewith a Poisson distribution:
-Aa f(a)Ae
whereA is a positive parameter.
Lifetime utility is the sumof
utility from expenditureeach period as defined inSection A
above. Maximizing lifetimeutility thus corresponds tothe
problem posited andsolved by Yaari (1965) whichBlanchard (1985)
imbeds into an aggregate
economy.8 Following Blanchard I assume
that A is also the birth rate.Hence the population isconstant
8An overlapping generations specificationwould imply equivalent
results to those reported here.See Mitchell (1987).13
at size one.
While alive, individuals earna constant wage w. Individual
nonhuman wealth takes the form of claimson firms, or direct
claims on capita]. or land. Thevalue of a firm is in turn
determined by the value of land andcapital that it owns and the
present discounted value of the currentand anticipated future
rents to which it has claim. Sincethere is no uncertainty, with
perfect foresight portfolioarbitrage will ensure that each asset
pays a return r*. As in Yaari's and Blanchard'sanalysis, a
perfectly competitive annuities market isassumed to exist. An
individual can consequentlyearn a return r*+A by promising to
transfer his nonhuman assets toan insurer at his death.
The problem S formulated incontinuous time.I first focus
on the stationary case in which worldcommodity prices, the world
interest rate, the endowments of landand labor, and inonoooly
prices and profits are constant. Inperiod t, an individual s
with nonhuman wealth W choosesan expenditure level c to
maximize:
s Jv(c,p)e dr
subject to the intertemporal budgetconstraint:
s w.S_(r*+A)r W +___)fce dr t r4-A tr14
and the equation of motionfor nonhuman wealth:
dW =(r*+AiW
+w—c.
Here 5E[O,1) is the subjectiverate of time preference.The




is satisfied. To focus onefficient steady states iassume also
that r*￿0.






whichis an individual's valuationof human wealth.15
Since any individual'sconsumption is proportional to his
total (nonhuman PIUS human)wealth, aggregate consumption is
proportional to total national wealth.Since nonhuman wealth
earns a social return r*, theequation of motion for national





In steady stateaggregate wealth is constant so that
dwt =0.Nonhuman wealth in steady state isconsequently:




Notethat, since factor prices areindependent of the
presence of monopoly, bothand are independent of p or 27:
The presence ofmonopoly in domestic supply does notaffect the
steady—sa level of expenditureor of national wealth as
jeasure in world prices.
Domestic monopoly causes thedomestic price level to exceed
the world price level, however.Consequently, in terms of
consumers prices, the steady—statelevels of consumption and16
national wealth are lowerwith monopolY.
ii. ForeignIndebtedfl
Domestic nonhuman wealthwDcogjStSof the discounted
present value ofland rents, capital andthe present discounted
value of monopoly rents.Hence, in steady state:
=+ D+
r*
wheredenotes the steady—statevalue of variable x.The
conditions etermifliflg ,, andr* are independent of pand ?.
Hencethe value, at world pricesof domestic land and capital,
like the steady-statevalue of national wealth,are unaffected by
the presence of monopolyin domestic supply.




F=W-W = — + K+- )(6—r+0A)
W.
Since,, andare independent ofif,PropositiOni follows:
PropoSitiOIL_l-Consider two economiesidentical in terms of17
their productiontechnologies, their endowmentsof land and
labor, their worldtrading opportunities and thepreferences of
their consumers. Theeconomy with more capitalizedmonopoly
rents will, in steadystate, be more highly indebted.The
difference in foreign debtequals the difference betweenthe
present discounted value of
capitalized monopoly rents inthe two
9 countries.
III. Liherpljzptipn andthe Current Account
Consider now theconsequences of a permanentliberalization,
in the form of theremoval of domesticmonopoly, at some
period o.Forconcreteness, assume that, prior tosome Period
T￿O, a zero Probability isattached to liberalization,but at
this time it becomesa certainty.
Liberalization does not affectfactor prices or the levelof
D domest.c capital Kduring any part of the transition.
Furthermore, as shown above, insteady state liberalization has
91t isinteresting to compare this resultwith Engel and Kletzerts (1987) analysisof the effect of a tariffon total indebtedness in a life-cycle
economy. They find that it depends crucially on how the tariffrevenue is distributed, andcontrast the implications oflump-sum distribution (or, whatIS equivalent in this framework,a wage subsidy) with a capitalsubsidy. Neither Is equivalent toits distribution asa perpetual claim on revenue, which is what I considerhere. If rents are not available as perpetuities butsupplement wage income thenthey increase steady—stateij wealth as well as domesticwealth. They consequently have a lessPositive effect on foreigndebt. The can even reduce it.18
no implications for
expenditure or fornational wealth, as
measured in world prices,either.
Liberalization affects thecurrent account in two ways.
First, it changes therelative price of commoditiesdomestically,
which creates an incentivefor intertempOralsubstitution of
consumption across periods.The implications ofthis effect for
the current account areambiguous. Second, tothe extent that
monopolies are domesticallY0W1, liberalization has awealth
effect. This reduces steady—statedebt. The current accountis
consequently positive during
the transition from monopolyto
laissez—faire.
Because the analysisof the transitional dynamicsis
complicated, I considereach effect in isolation.
A. The RelaiVPr1Ce
To focus attention onthe relative—price effectof reform,
consider the case in whichmonopolies are entirelytoreign—owned,
so that their eliminationhas no implications fornational
balance sheets.
Once liberalization iseffected, in period 0, allcommodity
prices faced by consumersare unity from then on.The value of
nonhuman wealth to consumersalive in period 0, denoted, J(W0,O)
is the solutiOn to the dynamicprogramming problem:19
J(W010) =max[f
subject to:
dwt =(r*+A)W + w-
andthe initial endowment of nonhumanwealth W0. This problem
has as its Solution:
J(W010)
where 4 is defined as above.Optimal behavior in period t is to
consume a proportion 4 of
(Wt+H).
Since the reform has no implicationsfor steady—state
national wealth, if the reform iscompletely unanticipated (T=O)
and the economy is initially insteady state, then reform does
not change national wealthtransitionally, either. When it
occurs it simply eliminates thatpart of foreign indebtedness
corresponding to foreign ownership of domesticmonopolies.
If reform is expected, however,then the anticipated change
in relative prices will affectdomestic saving. The value of
wealth in period t, denotedJ'(Wt,t), tE[T,O), is the Solution to
the problem:20
Jt(Wtit) =mxEf[cg(pfl1°e dr1 +
e(1* )tJ(w,o)
which is solved by:
c =4[g(p)(fl/Oe4t(le4t)]l(Wt+H).
Note, first of all, thatfor the special case inwhich c=1
(Bernoulli preferences)ireform has no implicationsfor
consumption; the optimalconsumption rule is the same asin the
case in which the relativeprice change isunanticipated, which
is to consume a fraction6+A of total wealth. Ifthe economy is
initially in steady state,announcement of a reform doesnot
change the level of expenditure,in world prices, at any period
between the announcementand the period of the change.There is
consequently no impact onnational wealth or on the current
account in any period betweenT and 0.
If c>i then the anticipationof reform causes consumptionto
rise in the period betweenthe announcement of reformand reform
itself. Anticipated reformthus causes a current—accountdeficit
that increases international
indebtedness. Once the reform
occurs the current accountbecomes positive untilnational
wealth, in world prices isrestored to its initial steady—state
level.
If c<i this trajectory is justreversed. The country runs a21
current—account surplus in anticipationof the reform. Once the
reform is implemented a deficitreduces wealth back to its
steady-state level.
The ambiguity in theresponse derives from theconflicting
income and substitution effectsof the relative pricechange.
The reform raises the realvalue of expected lifetimeincome for
the typical individual.This income effect favorsincreased
consumption during the period prior tothe reform. The reform
also raises the real valueof a given level ofexpenditure at
world prices in the post—reformperiod relative to the pre—reform
period. This substitution effectfavors Postponingconsumption
until after the reform. The
relative strengths of the two
effects depend on whethera1.
B.j'he Wealth Effect
Consider now the implicationsof reform for national wealth
when monopolies arewholly nationally_owned. To treatthis
effect in isolation from therelative—price effect just
discussed, it is convenient toset a=1. For concreteness
consider the case in which, beforethe reform, all industrial
commodities are monopolisticajlysupplied and n-..
From an initial steady statewith monopoly, theannouncement





where is aggregate expenditurein period t.
The optimal consumptionrule, that =(A)(wtl)implies




Thevalue of nonhuman wealthimmediately after announcement
of the reform, T' providesan initial conditOflfor this






whichis the steady—state velueof nonhuman wealth.
The value of nonhumanwealth immediately following
announcement of the reform, T'is given by:23
— — 0 (r*+A)(T_t) WT =- q+
)(a+fT (Wt-f)e dt,
the value of nonhuman wealthin steady state, less theinitial
steady—state value of monopolyprofits, plus the value of
monopoly profits until the reform.
Substituting the solution forW. into this expression
implies that:




If reform is totallyunanticipated (T=0) then the drop in
wealth upon announcement issimply .Asthe length of the
period of anticipation
approaches infinity (T-.oo) the effecton
wealth goes to zero.
The announcement of reformcauses an immediate decline in
nonhi.unan wealth that is followedby a current account surplus
that gradually restoreswealth to its initialsteady—state level.
At the time that reformactually takes place, the deviation of
(6+A -r*) T wealth from its steady statelevel is a fraction e of
the initial wealth loss.Hence the longer the reform is
anticipated, the less effect it hasOfl national wealth or on the
current account in any period.
The effect of increasingmonopoly restrictions is, of24
course,just the reverse ofthose of liberalization.The economy
runs a current accountdeficit to restore nationalwealth to its
steady—state level,eliminating the effect onwealth of the
initial allocation of monopolyrights. The extent towhich the
deficit occurs before theactual imposition of monopoly
restrictions depends Oflhowlong they have beenanticipated.
IV..LjeralizatiOfland Contemporary Welfare
The capitalization ofanticipated future monopolyrents
affects the intergenerational
allocation of the welfarebenefits
of a permanent liberalization.
The possibility arises that
removal of monopoly restrictionsreduces the expected welfareof
every individualalive at the time of thereform. The reason is
that, while liberalizationreduces consumer pricesit also
reduces the value of nonhumanwealth by the amount of the
discounted present value offuture monopoly rents.
Since monopoly distortsthe economy, as long as thewelfare
of unborn generations istaken into account, thebenefit from
price reduction mustexceed the capital loss.But while the
benefit is shared between theunborn and the currentlyalive, the
cost falls entirely on thosecurrently alive. Hence, thewelfare
of many, or even all, of thosealive may fall.
Consider an initial steadystate in which there are a large25
number of industrial
commodities each of whichis
monopojjstjcallv suppliedAs Shown above, thedomestic price of
these goods will be1/8. In the absenceof reform, theexpected
discounted Utility ofan individual aged a witha level of
nonhuman wealth, a Is:
J(Wa,)e_(ä)t_J__or(i/9)a(Wa+H)JI_o
Assuming that domesticmonopolies are entirely
nationally_owned, a liberalizationImposes a capital lossequal
to the present discounted
value of monopoly profitsin the
initial steady state,which equals
Immediately following apermanent liberalization theexpected
discounted value of theUtility of individual ageda becomes:
— —(o+A)t1 —oa J(W,t)=e [(W +H)(1 -
Here8a is theshare of monopolyassets owned by individual
aged a.
The implications ofa liberalization for thewelfare of this
individual dependUpOn whether the first orsecond of these two
expressions is greater. This
depends, among otherthings, on
The most straightforw
case to consider is theone in which
these claims aredistributed in proportionto indivjduajs total26
wealth, Wa+H. In this casethe comparison is the samefor every
individual, since the ratioSa/(W+11 is unity independentof a.
Liberalization then raises orlowers welfare depending UOfl
whether:
a(r*+A)(l_0)
Consider the case in whicha1/2. aifltaifliflg monopoly
rather than jberaliZiflgimplies a higherlevel of welfare for
those alive if:
0
whichis non—empty if 5>r*.Satisfying this conditiOflrequires
that the extent of monopoly powernot be too great (i.e.,that 0
notbe too close to zero)and that the country havenegative net
nonhuman wealth in steadystate (i.e., that o>r*).
A similar result, of course,obtains on the implicationsof
introducing monopoly from aninitial laissez—faire steadystate.
Such a move can benefitall livingindividuals.'
101t is important to note that the optionto liberalize for the
current period only, ratherthan permanefltlYi wouldalways be
favored over permanent monopolyby at least someliving
individuals. Similarly, atleast some individualswould always
oppose the impositionof monopoly for onlythe current period.27
V.Qfltradeaded Goods andMultiple Eg1i1ibrj
The discussionup to this point hasposited that the number
of Commoditiesfreely tradedinternationally is sufficient for
internationalcommodity prices to determinefactor rewards
independently of domesticmarket CofiditionsIntroducing
nontraded goods can breakthis independence,thereby introducing
the Possibility ofmultiple equilibrj,some of which strictly
dominate others interms of Paretoefficiency.
To illustrate thisPossibIlIty, consider flowa situation in
which legal prohibitionsor natural barriersprevent trade in
industrial commodities,but the agricultur
commodity is freely
traded. Forconcreteness continue toassume that all industrial
commodities are
monopolistically supplied and thatthe number of
such commodities islarge.
In the absence of
international arbitrageopportunities for
industrial commodities,the cost of productionwill typically
differ from the worldprice of unity. Denotethe unit cost of
production as a of factor rewardsas a(w,r*,p).
Monopolistic suppliers whotake their rivals'output prices and





industrial commodities equalsdomestic demand
C', which equals total expenditure
divided by price, i.e.,:
IC =aco/a(w,r*,P)
whereC continues to denotetotal expenditure.







Herea.(W,r*,P) denotes thederivative of the unItcost function
with respect to factorreward I, which equalsthe demand for
factor i per unit produced.Marginal productiVitY
conditions in




Together, these six conditionsdetermine factor rewards w
and p, the domesticcapital stock KD, and the divisionof the
three factors between thetwo industries as functionsof the
world interest rate r* and ofdomestic expenditure c.In steady
state, c continues to be givenby the Condition:
C = = 1Tw.
where 4 4{A/(r*+A)(5+oA_r*)J
This condition and the six
conditIon6 above fully characterizethe steady state of the
economy. There may be more than oneset of values for w,p. K,
L1, K', and T'that satisfy these equations.Each set may
correspond to different equilibria thatcan be Pareto—ranked, as
the following exampleillustrates.
Consider a case in which theproduction technology in
industry is Leontjef, and does notuse land. Thus a(w,r*,p)
w+r*. The productiontechnology in agriculture is of the form:
HLALA<T
=LALA>T
where >>o. Thus labor hasa high average productivity in30
agriculture if it isless plentiful thanland, but a low average
productiVitY if it is moreplentiful. Assume thatTE(0,1).
The demand for laborin the industrial sectoras a function
of factor prices is given by:
I aOAt
L=
whichis an increasing functionof the wage w.If:
— cxO4' -
thenin one steady state1L. If, in addition:
1-T—-—--i￿1,
1 +r*
thenin another steady state
w=. Employment in industry Is
greater in the high—wagesteady state, as is thelevel of
domestic investment. Eventhough the increase inthe wage raises
the cost of producing the
industrial good, which is passedon to
consumers with a mark—upfactor of 1/0 ,thereal wage, and the
value of real wealth, is greaterin the high-wage steadystate.
Consequently the expectedutility of the averageindividual is
higher in this steadystate as well.
A movement from the lowto the high_wage equilibriumreduces31
the value of land tozero. it also increases the valueof
monopoly rents. it may do so bymore than an offsetting amount.
in this case land—ownerscan be compensated for theircapital
loss on land byreceiving the capitalized value of theadditional
monopoly rents. With such a transferscheme in effect a movement
from the low to thehigh—wage equilibrium constitutesa Pareto—
improvement.
It is ambiguous as to whethernet international indebtedness
is greater or less in thehigh—wage steady state relative tothe
low—wage one. At the higherwage national wealth is greater, but
SO, typically, is the value of domesticwealth. (The amount of
capital and the value of
monopoly rents are higher, but land is
worth less.)
VI. Extensions
To focus attention onseveral basic points I have madea
number of specific assumptionsabout the nature of the
environment under consideration
First, I have ignored potential
credit rationing and default
on international debt. Forone thing, introducing these
considerations would break theindependence between domestic
monopoly and the level of domesticinvestment even in the absence
of nontraded goods.Capitalized monopoly rents woulddisplace32
domestic savings as a sourceof investment. ConseqUefltlYthe
presence of domesticmonopolY would reduce thecapital stock and
raise the interest rate, asin Laitner'S (1982) discUssion.If
land and capital are complementary
factors then monopolywill
result in a lower wage evenat world prices. Fromthe point of
view of comparing steady
states, welfare will be evenlower in
the steady state with monopoly.For this reason capitalmobility
mitigates the cost of monopoly.
Second, there has been nodiscussion here of the
implications of ncertaiflty,in particular uncertaintyabout
potential reform or aboutswitches among alternativeequilibria.
These considerations complicatethe problem of pricing monopoly
assets and of aracteriZiflgoptimal consumption.
Third, I have ignored the
ent-seekiflg activities of the
sort discussed by Krueger(1974) and by Bhagwatiand SriniVaSafl
(1982). introducing theseactivities would reduce the
capitalized value of monopolyrents
absorb resources contemPoraneously
with the accrual of rer.As
argued by McCormick, Shughart,and TolliSon (1984), however,in
many realisticsituations rent—seeking activitymay absorb
resources at the timemonopolies are firstestablished. Once
monopolies exist then theanalysis here applies.In other words,
the analysis here appliesto situations in whichrent seeking
URomer (1986) and Trefil (1987) discussthe solution to dynamic
optimization problems withstochastic regime shifts.33
occurred to obtain a license
initially, but is notneeded to
maintain ownership ofthe license.
Finally, and perhaps ofgreatest potentialinterest, I have
not explored thedeterminants of thedistribution of claimson
monopoly across thePopulation. The discussionof the Political
Popularity of liberalizationpointed to thisdistribution as
affecting whether voterswould favor oroppose liberalization.
The distribution ofassets in theeconomy is consequently not
neutral even though,when a givenpolicy is in place, allassets
earn the same rate ofreturn.34
APPENDIX
Consider the problemof the retailer of goodi in setting
its price p1. This
firm observes a priceof unity for the
competitivelYta3ledcommoditiesm+1 to n+1, and, in a
symmetric equilibriumsa priceM for the monoPOliSt1HY
retailed commodities 1to m other than i.Its profit ni is:
=(p.1)C1(P1sP)
where c1 denotes
demand for good I as afunction of the price
charged by retailer iand by all othermonopoliStIC retailers.
Denote bycM the quantity consumed of eachof the goods
monopoliSticallY retailed,
other than i, and bycF the quantity
consumed of each of theindustrial goods competitively
retailed.
First-order cdit1Ofl5for utility maxirrLiZati0by the
representative consumerensure that:




Combining these cOnditions with thebudget constraint
M F p1c+ (m-1)c +(n—m)c=cxC
providesan expression forc given by:
- aC/p. —
(ml)(p/M)O/(0)+(n_m)(p1)O10)+
Substitutingthis expression into theexpression for retailer l's
profit above gives:
aC(p. —1)/p.
Combining the first-order Condition fora maximum with the
condition that, in a symmetricequilibri, all monopolistic
retailers charge the sameprice (so thatp1 =M)implies that
the price charged by amonopolistic retailer is determinedby the
expression:
(n_m)(pM)O/(9) +m =(pM1)[9/(l 9)][( MO/(l_O)+rn-i].
The two special casesreported in the text are obtainedby
setting n=m and by holding n/rnconstant and letting n..oo.36
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